We propose a model of organizational decision making, in which information processing is decentralized. Our model incorporates two features of many actual organizations:
Introduction
Organizational decisions are usually based on large quantities of information. Such information cannot be processed by a single agent. Therefore, information processing has to be decentralized among many agents. Consider, for example, the decision to expand a production plant. This decision depends on information about the plant's cost, known mainly by the plant manager. It also depends on information about the demand for the plant's output, known by marketing managers. Finally, it can depend on broader information about the organization's strategy, known by top-level managers.
This paper proposes a model of organizational decision making, in which information processing is decentralized, and information is communicated along hierarchical lines. The model has two novel elements, relative to previous literature. First, aggregation entails a loss of useful information, in the sense that when agents summarize their information to their hierarchical superiors, information which is useful to the superiors is lost. Second, agents' decision problems interact, in the sense that an agent's optimal decision should depend on information held by agents in other parts of the organization. We use our model to examine issues of organization design. In particular, we determine what hierarchical structure an organization should adopt, and in what hierarchical level the returns to employing agents who are better able to process information are the highest.
Our model is motivated from how investment firms form their portfolios. Because of the large number of securities involved, investment firms rarely perform a full-scale portfolio optimization. Rather, they follow a multi-stage hierarchical procedure. An example of this procedure, for the case of three stages, is described in Sharpe (1985, p.657 
):
In the first stage (security selection), combinations of securities in each of the several stock groups and in each of the several bond groups are selected. The second stage (group selection) involves the determination of an appropriate combination of the stock group portfolios and an appropriate combination of the bond group portfolios. The final stage is devoted to asset allocation, using the bond and stock portfolios as asset-class portfolios. In every stage but the last, decisions are made myopically, considering only a subset of the available securities. In every stage but the first, groups of securities are "locked together" in fixed proportions determined in prior stages.
In this hierarchical procedure, agents' decision problems obviously interact. Consider, for example, an analyst forming a portfolio of stocks within a given group. The analyst's are three design parameters: the hierarchical structure, the assets each agent examines, and agents' decision rules, i.e., the way agents map their information into portfolio weights.
The optimal set of parameters must implement a decision rule for the organization that maximizes the expected utility of asset payoffs. Intuitively, this decision rule must select a portfolio that is the closest possible to the first-best portfolio, selected in the absence of agents' information processing limitations.
While our model is motivated from portfolio formation in investment firms, it is also applicable to other organizational settings. A direct application is to risk management, by both financial and non-financial firms. Indeed, risk management can be viewed as a hierarchical portfolio formation procedure, where each unit in a firm determines its portfolio of risky activities, and then risk managers control the overall level of risk. 1 A more indirect application is to capital budgeting, i.e., firms' choice of physical investments. Consider, for example, the decision to build a production plant, and suppose that the plant's design (which can be viewed as a "portfolio" of attributes) should depend significantly on the specific mix of products that will be manufactured in the plant. A design proposed to headquarters by the organization's manufacturing department might then be suboptimal, because it might be missing important marketing information. Such interactions between manufacturing and marketing, or between different manufacturing departments, seem quite common in practice. 2 To solve the organization design problem, we must make an assumption on the probability distribution of factor loadings as of the design stage. We first consider the simple case where factor loadings are i.i.d. across assets, with mean zero. Agents' optimal decision rules are then myopic as described in Sharpe (1985) , i.e., agents form their portfolios ignoring interactions with assets outside the portfolios. Under these decision rules, the organization's investment in a particular asset differs from the first-best investment, as long as the agent at the top of the hierarchy does not examine the asset directly. This is because the top agent needs to adjust the investment in the asset to take into account interactions ignored 1 For a general presentation of risk management and value at risk, see, for example, Litterman (1996) , Alexander (1998), and Jorion (2000) . Ch.9 in Alexander and ch.16 in Jorion emphasize, in particular, that while risk managers set limits for the level of risk that each unit in a firm can take, they do not dictate the portfolio of a unit's risky activities. For the notion that the portfolios formed by different units in a firm may fail to be globally optimal, see also Naik and Yadav (2001) . These authors find that dealers in the London Stock Exchange control their inventories without fully taking into account the covariance with the inventories of other dealers in the same firm.
2 Bower (1970) presents four detailed case studies of capital budgeting in a large corporation. Closest to our discussion is the case on Specialty Plastics, where a proposal for a new plant was formulated by engineers in one manufacturing department. The proposal was not very successful, and one reason was that although the engineers had consulted with divisional headquarters, they had not consulted sufficiently with their marketing department, or with other manufacturing departments that could benefit from using the plant.
by his subordinates. Since he has only aggregated information, however, his adjustment is imperfect.
Given the optimal decision rules, we can evaluate the performance of different hierarchical structures. Quite surprisingly, in the optimal hierarchical structure, all agents have one subordinate. The intuition is that for independent factor loadings, the average factor loading of even a small set of assets differs significantly from the factor loading of each asset in the set. Therefore, aggregation results in a loss of useful information, even when it concerns only a few assets. As a result, it is optimal for the top agent to examine directly as many assets as possible.
In the optimal hierarchical structure, all agents work at full capacity, handling exactly K assets or portfolios. Only one agent may work below capacity, due to integer constraints.
Interestingly, this agent can be at any hierarchical level. Interpreting this agent as a low ability agent, who can handle fewer than K assets or portfolios, our result implies that returns to ability are independent of the hierarchical level. Intuitively, the benefit of the top agent working at full capacity is that he can process more disaggregated information, while the corresponding benefit for the bottom agent is that he can take more interactions into account. For independent factor loadings, these turn out to be equal. When factor loadings are not i.i.d., the organization design problem becomes more complicated, and we solve it only in some special cases. We first assume that factor loadings are the sum of a component common to all assets, and an i.i.d. component. We show that the one-subordinate result of the i.i.d. case still holds, but returns to ability are highest at the bottom of the hierarchy. We next consider an example where assets are partitioned into groups, and factor loadings are the sum of a group and an i.i.d. component. The one-subordinate result holds again, which is perhaps more surprising than in the i.i.d. and common component cases. Indeed, one would expect the loss from information aggregation to decrease if the top agent has multiple subordinates, each examining assets in one group.
One feature of actual organizations which is not captured in our model, and which might explain why agents have multiple subordinates, is that there are returns to specialization.
In investment firms, for example, it is efficient to assign all stocks within an industry sector to a single analyst, so that the analyst can develop expertise on that sector. To capture returns to specialization, we consider our group component example, with the modification that agents observe factor loadings imperfectly. This ensures that knowing an asset's factor loading is useful when observing factor loadings of other assets in the same group. We then show that it is optimal for the top agent to have multiple subordinates, and that returns to ability are highest at the top of the hierarchy. These results are, of course, derived in the context of an example, but they suggest an interesting direction to extend the model. This paper belongs to a large literature that studies organizations with boundedly rational agents, and abstracts from incentive issues. 3 Crémer (1980), Aoki (1986), and Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) , study resource allocation in organizations, using the team-theoretic approach of Marschak and Radner (1972) . We also use this approach in the derivation of agents' optimal decision rules. The main difference with these papers is that we consider hierarchical communication, where an agent's information comes from his subordinates. Radner (1993) considers a model with hierarchical communication. He assumes that an organization performs an associative operation involving many items. An agent needs one unit of time to perform the operation on two items. Decentralizing the operation to a hierarchy of agents, where agents communicate partial results to their superiors, is valuable because it reduces the time it takes to process all the items. Van Zandt (1999b) extends Radner's "batch processing" framework to "real-time processing", where items arrive in each period, and the organization has to select which items to process. 4 Beckmann (1960 4 Beckmann ( , 1983 and Levhari (1979, 1983) are precursor papers that restrict attention to balanced hierarchies, where all agents at a given level have the same number of subordinates. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) assume that decentralization is valuable not because it reduces delay, but because it allows agents to specialize by processing the same type of items more frequently. These papers, however, consider associative operations, where there is no aggregation loss and no interactions. 5 Garicano (2000) and Beggs (2001) consider hierarchical communication in organizations that handle heterogeneous tasks. Tasks that cannot be handled by agents at a given level, are sent one level up, where agents can either handle a larger set of tasks (Beggs) , or specialize in handling less frequent tasks (Garicano) . In these papers, however, tasks can be handled independently, and thus there are no interactions. Harris and Raviv (2001) assume interactions between activities, and examine how these determine the structure (matrix, functional, or divisional) that an organization should 3 For a survey of this literature, see Van Zandt (1999a) . 4 The batch and real-time processing models have been applied to a number of organizational issues such as returns to scale (Radner and Van Zandt (1992) , Van Zandt and Radner (2001) ), resource allocation (Van Zandt (2000a , 2000b ), returns to ability (Prat (1997) ), and internal structure (Orbay (2002) ).
5 Consider, for example, the selection of the best project out of a pool, i.e., the maximum operation. There is no aggregation loss because the best project out of a subset is a "sufficient statistic" for all the projects in the subset. There are no interactions because the best project out of a subset does not depend on the quality of the projects outside the subset.
adopt. Hart and Moore (2000) also emphasize interactions in their theory of allocation of decision rights within a firm. These papers, however, adopt a reduced-form approach in modelling interactions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 considers the case where factor loadings are i.i.d., and Section 4 considers the general case.
Section 5 concludes, and all proofs are in two Appendices.
The Model
We consider an organization that forms an asset portfolio, over three periods, 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, the organization is designed. In period 1, the assets' factor loadings are randomly drawn, and the organization forms its portfolio in a way that depends on its design. Finally, in period 2, the assets pay off. We first describe the assets in which the organization can invest, and then the organization designer's objective, constraints, and choice variables.
Assets
There is one riskless and N risky assets. The return on the riskless asset is zero. The returns on the risky assets follow a simple factor structure. Asset n, n = 1, .., N , returns
where µ n is a constant, η an aggregate factor (e.g., the business cycle), λ n asset n's factor loading (the sensitivity to the factor), and n asset n's idiosyncratic risk. The idiosyncratic risk is independent across assets, and is independent of the aggregate factor. Both the aggregate factor and the idiosyncratic risk have mean zero, and thus µ n is asset n's expected return. 6
In addition to assuming a simple factor structure, we assume the following. First, η and { n } n=1,..,N are normal, and thus portfolio choice can be reduced to a mean-variance problem. Second, all assets have the same expected return and idiosyncratic variance, i.e., µ n = µ and E( 2 n ) = σ 2 for all n. Assets thus differ only in their factor loadings. Finally, E(η 2 ) = σ 2 , which is without loss of generality, since we can redefine the factor loadings.
Organization Designer's Objective
We assume that in period 0, the organization designer knows µ and σ 2 . (He does not know, however, the factor loadings {λ n } n=1,..,N , which are randomly drawn according to some probability distribution in period 1.) The organization designer maximizes the expected utility of the organization's period 2 asset payoffs where, for simplicity, utility is exponential with CARA a. Since the organization designer evaluates expected utility in period 0, the expectation is computed w.r.t. η, { n } n=1,..,N , and {λ n } n=1,..,N .
Asset payoffs are
where x n denotes the organization's investment in risky asset n, and W the organization's initial wealth. Setting, for simplicity, W = 0, and using equation (1), we can write the expected utility of asset payoffs as
Taking expectations w.r.t. η and { n } n=1,..,N , which are independent and normal, we can write expected utility as
where the expectation is now w.r.t. {λ n } n=1,..,N only. Equation (2) represents the organization designer's objective. This objective takes an intuitive form. For a given set of factor loadings, the organization designer takes into consideration the mean and the variance of the organization's portfolio. The mean is equal to N n=1 x n µ, while the variance is the sum of two terms. First, a term which corresponds to aggregate risk, and depends on the factor loading of the organization's portfolio ( N n=1 x n λ n ), and second, a term which corresponds to idiosyncratic risk.
Organization Designer's Constraints
The organization designer is subject to three constraints.
Communication Constraint: We assume that (i) the organization must have a hierarchical structure, and (ii) communication must take place along hierarchical lines, from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy. We represent the agents in a hierarchy by sequences of positive integers. The agent at the top corresponds to the null sequence, "·". His first subordinate, starting from the left, corresponds to the sequence 1, his second subordinate to the sequence 2, and so on. Similarly, the first subordinate of the first subordinate corresponds to the sequence 1,1, the second subordinate to the sequence 1,2, and so on. We denote a sequence by j, and refer to the corresponding agent as agent j. We denote by J the set of all agents. Finally, we denote by S(j) the number of (direct) subordinates of agent j. Figure 1 illustrates the notation for a simple hierarchy.
Each agent in the hierarchy may examine some risky assets, i.e., observe their factor loadings. We denote by M (j) the number of assets that agent j examines, and by A M (j) their set. We assume that each asset is examined by only one agent, i.e., the sets {A M (j)} j∈J form a partition of {1, .., N }. We refer to the assets examined by agent j, or by his direct or indirect subordinates, as the assets under j's control. We denote by N (j) the number of these assets, and by A N (j) their set.
Communication takes place as follows. An agent at the bottom of the hierarchy observes the factor loadings of the assets he examines. He then forms a portfolio of these assets, and communicates the portfolio's factor loading to his superior. The superior observes the factor loadings of his subordinates' portfolios, and of the assets he (directly) examines. He then forms a portfolio of all the assets under his control, and communicates the portfolio's factor loading to his own superior. This process continues until the top of the hierarchy, and the portfolio formed by the top agent is also that of the organization. We denote by x n (j) the investment of agent j in an asset n under his control, and by
x n (j)λ n , the factor loading of agent j's portfolio.
Scaling Constraint: We assume that agents cannot change the composition of their subordinates' portfolios, but can only scale portfolios up or down, i.e., multiply the investment in each asset by the same scalar. We denote by y i (j) the scaling factor that agent j applies to the portfolio of his ith subordinate, i = 1, .., S(j). The investment of agent j in an asset n ∈ A N (j, i) is thus x n (j) = y i (j)x n (j, i).
Processing Constraint: We assume that agents can form a portfolio of at most K < ∞ inputs, where an input can be either an asset agents (directly) examine, or a subordinate's portfolio. 7 The processing constraint for agent j is
The processing constraint is fundamental to the organization design problem, since in its absence (i.e., if K = ∞) the organization would trivially consist of only one agent.
This constraint might be capturing agents' limitations in collecting information, i.e., observing assets' factor loadings, and learning portfolios' factor loadings from subordinates.
Alternatively, it might be capturing agents' limitations in processing the information. Both types of limitations seem quite important in practice. 8 The communication and scaling constraints capture some features of the portfolio formation process in investment firms.
Needless to say, it would be desirable to derive these features endogenously. In Section 4, we show that in some cases, the scaling constraint can indeed be endogenized. We also discuss generalizations of the communication constraint.
Organization Designer's Choice Variables
The organization designer can choose three aspects of the organization, all of which can influence the portfolio the organization forms in period 1.
Hierarchical Structure: The organization designer can choose any hierarchical structure satisfying the processing constraint (3).
Assignment of Assets to Agents: The organization designer can choose which assets each agent examines. Of course, this choice is trivial when the assets are identical ex-ante, i.e., as of period 0.
Agents' Decision Rules: The organization designer can choose the decision rules that agents use when forming their portfolios. A decision rule for agent j is a mapping from j's information to j's controls. Agent j's information is
7 Note that treating a subordinate's portfolio as a single asset is consistent with the communication and scaling constraints. Indeed, under the communication constraint, an agent's information on a subordinate's portfolio is only the factor loading, as in the case of a single asset. Moreover, under the scaling constraint, the agent's control on the portfolio is only the scaling factor, i.e., is one-dimensional as for a single asset.
8 For example, in his presentation of risk management, Litterman (1996) states that: "The choice of how finely to disaggregate the data is a compromise between accuracy of risk management, which comes from disaggregation, and the clarity that comes from aggregation. In addition, lack of availability of data or computing resources may limit the degree to which positions can be analyzed on a disaggregated basis."
i.e., the factor loadings of the assets j examines, and the factor loadings of the portfolios of j's subordinates. Agent j's controls are
i.e., investments in the assets j examines, and scaling factors for the portfolios of j's subordinates.
A given hierarchical structure, assignment of assets to agents, and decision rule for each agent, implement a decision rule for the organization, i.e., a mapping from factor loadings to investments by the organization. A decision rule for the organization determines, in turn, the organization designer's expected utility, from equation (2). The organization designer's optimization problem is to implement a decision rule for the organization that maximizes expected utility.
First-Best
To analyze the organization designer's problem, it is useful to consider the first-best decision rule. This rule selects the investments {x * n } n=1,..,N that maximize expected utility conditional on factor loadings, i.e., the investments that solve
Obviously, the first-best rule maximizes expected utility. Therefore, if it is implementable (through a choice of hierarchical structure, assignment of assets to agents, and agents' decision rules) it is the solution to the organization designer's problem.
To gain intuition on whether the first-best rule is implementable, we consider the simple case where factor loadings are small. We assume, in particular, that λ n = λ n , where λ goes to zero and the probability distribution of { n } n=1,..,N is held constant. For small factor loadings, x * n becomes
where o(λ 2 )/λ 2 goes to zero as λ goes to zero. 9 The first-best investment in asset n is equal to µ/aσ 2 , minus an adjustment for aggregate risk, obtained by multiplying the factor 9 The first-order condition of the problem (4) is
Plugging x * n = µ/aσ 2 + o(1) in the RHS, we obtain equation (5).
loading of asset n times the sum of all assets' factor loadings. Intuitively, asset n is penalized if it is risky, and the penalty increases with the riskiness of the rest of the asset portfolio.
When factor loadings are deterministic, the first-best rule is easily implementable. The organization designer can, for example, instruct agents to choose investments equal to x * n for each asset n they examine, and scaling factors equal to 1. This implements the first-best rule, for any hierarchical structure and assignment of assets to agents.
When factor loadings are stochastic, the first-best rule is generally not implementable.
The organization designer cannot, for example, instruct an agent to choose x * n , since x * n depends on the factor loadings of all assets, which are generally not all known by any single agent. For example, an agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, who examines asset n, knows λ n , but generally not the factor loading of the rest of the asset portfolio. The agent's hierarchical superiors have better aggregate information on the portfolio's factor loading, but do not have the disaggregated information on λ n .
When the first-best rule is not implementable, the organization designer's problem consists in implementing a second-best rule. This problem is potentially very complicated, since it involves optimization over a large, discrete set of hierarchical structures and assignments of assets to agents, and also over an infinite set of agents' decision rules. In Sections 3 and 4, we solve this problem in a number of special cases.
Agents' Decision Rules
To simplify the derivation of agents' optimal decision rules, we assume that these are smooth, in the sense of having a Taylor expansion of order two around λ = 0. For λ = 0, the firstbest investment in each asset is µ/aσ 2 , from equation (5). This can be implemented by decision rules where agents invest µ/aσ 2 in each asset they examine, and set scaling factors equal to 1.
Assumption 1 There exists a selection of optimal decision rules, parametrized by λ, such that for each agent j,
for n ∈ A M (j), and
, where f n (j) and g i (j) contain first-and second-degree terms in γ(j) and
In Proposition 1, we determine f n (j) and g i (j). To state the proposition, we set
Intuitively, Λ(j) represents the factor loading of agent j's portfolio for small λ. Indeed, since for small λ all assets in the portfolio receive approximately the same investment µ/aσ 2 , the portfolio's factor loading is
Proposition 1 Suppose that factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero. Then, there exists a selection of optimal decision rules such that for each agent j, x n (j) and y i (j) are as in Assumption 1 with
and
To illustrate Proposition 1, we consider the hierarchical structure in Figure 1 . Equation (5) implies that the first-best investment in asset 1 is
Consider now the organization's investment in asset 1. The investment of agent 1,1, who is at the bottom of the hierarchy and examines asset 1, is
Intuitively, agent 1,1 attempts to replicate the first-best investment, but does not know the factor loadings λ 3 and λ 4 . He replaces these with his best guess, which is zero since factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero. Agent 1 scales agent 1,1's investment by
Therefore, the investment of agent 1 is
Intuitively, agent 1 adjusts agent 1,1's investment to take into account the factor loading λ 3 , that he knows but agent 1,1 does not. Unlike agent 1,1, however, agent 1 does not know λ 1 , and replaces it by his best guess, which is (λ 1 + λ 2 )/2. (Agent 1's only information on λ 1 is the factor loading of agent 1,1's portfolio, which for small λ is λ 1 + λ 2 . Since factor loadings are i.i.d., agent 1's expectation of λ 1 conditional on λ 1 + λ 2 is (λ 1 + λ 2 )/2.) Proceeding as for agent 1, we find that the investment of the top agent is
The top agent adjusts agent 1's investment to take into account λ 4 . He has, however, to replace λ 1 by his best guess, which is (λ 1 + λ 2 + λ 3 )/3.
The difference between the organization's investment in an asset n, x n , and the first-best investment, x * n , reflects the organization's decision-making error. Defining the error, e n , for asset n as the lowest order term in (x n − x * n )/( µ aσ 2 ), we have in our example
The error for asset 1 is the sum of two errors, one associated with agent 1 and one with the top agent. Each of these errors takes an intuitive form as the product of two terms, an interaction term and an aggregation loss term. The interaction term reflects the fact that an agent adjusts a subordinate's investment to take into account interactions with assets whose factor loadings the subordinate does not know. For example, the interaction term for agent 1 is λ 3 , because this agent takes into account the interaction with asset 3. The aggregation loss term reflects the fact that when adjusting a subordinate's investment, an agent has only aggregate information, which is imperfect. For example, the aggregation loss term for agent 1 is
This is because when adjusting his subordinate's investment, agent 1 does not know the factor loading of asset 1, λ 1 , and replaces it by the average factor loading of assets 1 and 2,
It is worth emphasizing that Proposition 1 determines agents' optimal decision rules for any given hierarchical structure. Furthermore, these rules are myopic as described in Sharpe (1985) , i.e., agents form their portfolios ignoring interactions with assets outside the portfolios. Using Proposition 1, we now proceed to evaluate the performance of different hierarchical structures, and determine the optimal structure.
Hierarchical Structure
An optimal hierarchical structure must maximize the organization designer's expected utility. For small factor loadings, expected utility takes a simple form.
Lemma 1 A hierarchical stucture that maximizes expected utility for small λ, must mini-
Equation (9) is a sum over assets of the expected squared error for each asset (where expectation is w.r.t. the factor loadings). This measures the distance between the organization's decision rule and the first-best decision rule. An optimal hierarchical structure must minimize this distance. We should emphasize that, unlike all other results in Section 3, this result does not require i.i.d. factor loadings.
In Lemma 2, we compute the sum of expected squared errors for a general hierarchical structure, and i.i.d. factor loadings.
Lemma 2 Suppose that factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero, and agents follow the optimal decision rules of Proposition 1. Then,
where σ 2 λ ≡ E(λ 2 n ).
The intuition behind equation (10) is as follows. Consider an agent j, and an asset n in the portfolio of j's ith subordinate (agent j, i). The component of the error for asset n, that is associated with agent j, is the product of an interaction and an aggregation loss term.
The interaction term is the sum of the factor loadings of the N (j) − N (j, i) assets that are under the control of j but not of j, i. Since factor loadings are i.i.d., the expected squared interaction term is
The aggregation loss term is the factor loading of asset n minus the average factor loading of the N (j, i) assets that are under the control of j, i. Since for i.i.d. random variables {λ n } n=1,..,N , we have
the expected squared aggregation loss term is
Multiplying the expected squared interaction and aggregation loss terms by the N (j, i) assets in j, i's portfolio, and summing over i and j, we obtain equation (10).
In Proposition 2, we characterize optimal hierarchical structures.
Proposition 2 Suppose that factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero. In any optimal hierarchical structure:
i. agents must have one subordinate (except the bottom agent),
ii. agents must handle exactly K assets or portfolios, except at most one agent.
The first, and somewhat surprising, result of Proposition 2 is that in an optimal hierarchical structure, agents have only one subordinate. To explain the intuition, we consider the hierarchical structures H 1 and H 2 in Figure 2 . Both hierarchical structures are for N = 4
and K = 2, and according to Proposition 2, H 1 is optimal.
The main advantage of H 1 over H 2 is that it selects a better investment in asset 4.
Indeed, in both H 1 and H 2 , it is the top agent who adjusts the investment in asset 4 to take into account the interaction with assets 1 and 2. In H 1 , however, the top agent knows the exact factor loading of asset 4, while in H 2 he only knows the average factor loading of assets 3 and 4. Therefore, the aggregation loss term (associated with asset 4 and the top agent) is zero in H 1 , but non-zero in H 2 . Conversely, the disadvantage of H 1 over H 2 is that it selects worse investments in assets 1 and 2. Indeed, in both H 1 and H 2 , it is the top agent who adjusts the investments in assets 1 and 2 to take into account the interaction with asset 4. In H 2 , however, the top agent knows the average factor loading of assets 1 and 2, while in H 1 he only knows the average factor loading of assets 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, the aggregation loss term (associated with assets 1 or 2, and the top agent) is larger in H 1 than in H 2 .
The reason why H 1 dominates H 2 is that for independent factor loadings, the benefit of knowing an exact factor loading instead of an average (as is the case for asset 4) exceeds the cost of knowing an average that is less precise (as is the case for assets 1 and 2). In other words, the average of two independent factor loadings is not much closer to one factor loading, than is the average of three or more, i.e., the aggregation loss term is not much larger for three than for two assets. Indeed, the expected squared aggregation loss term is
The function a(N ) is maximum for N = ∞, and achieves half of its maximum value for N = 2.
In Table 1 , we compute the expected squared errors for H 1 and H 2 (omitting σ 4 λ , for notational simplicity). The second result of Proposition 2 is that in an optimal hierarchical structure, all agents except perhaps one work at full capacity, handling exactly K assets or portfolios. The intuition is simply that the decentralization of information processing, which arises from the processing constraint, reduces decision quality. Therefore, it is optimal to minimize decentralization, by making the processing constraint binding.
An agent working below capacity may exist only because of integer constraints. When, for example, N = 4 and K = 3, the optimal hierarchical structures (H a and H b , shown in Figure 3 ) consist of two agents, only one of whom works at full capacity. By contrast, when N = 5 and K = 3, both agents work at full capacity.
The existence of an agent working below capacity offers one way to get at the question of how returns to ability depend on the hierarchical level. Indeed, an agent working below capacity can be interpreted as a low ability agent, who can handle fewer than K assets or portfolios. Such an agent should be at the hierarchical level where returns to ability are the smallest.
Interestingly, Proposition 2 shows that an agent working below capacity can be at any hierarchical level. When, for example, N = 4 and K = 3, such an agent can be either at the bottom of the hierarchy (in H a ) or at the top (in H b ). This means that returns to ability are independent of the hierarchical level. In other words, the benefit of placing a high ability agent at the top of the hierarchy (the agent can process more disagreggated information) is equal to the benefit of placing the agent at the bottom (the agent can form a better portfolio, taking interactions with more assets into account).
Generalizations and Extensions
In this section, we study the organization designer's problem when factor loadings are not i.i.d., and we examine how the results of the i.i.d. case can generalize. We first characterize agents' optimal decision rules for a general hierarchical structure and probability distribution of factor loadings. We next solve the organization designer's problem for two specific probability distributions, and also in an extension of the model that incorporates returns to specialization. Finally, we discuss ways to relax the communication and scaling constraints.
Agents' Decision Rules
Before presenting the general characterization of agents' optimal decision rules, we show that these can be computed explicitly when the hierarchical structure and probability distribution of factor loadings satisfy a "sufficient statistic" condition. To state this condition, we denote by H(j) agent j's subordinate hierarchy (consisting of j, and j's direct and indirect subordinates), and by J(j) the set of agents in H(j). We also set
to represent the factor loading of the portfolio of assets outside H(j), and
to represent agent j's information, both for small λ. Finally, we denote by I(j) the information set generated by Γ(j), and byĪ(j) that generated by {Γ(j )} j ∈J(j) .
Condition 1 For each agent j,
Condition 1 requires that the agents in j's subordinate hierarchy have no incremental information, relative to agent j, on the factor loading of the portfolio of assets outside the subordinate hierarchy. In other words, agent j knows aggregate information concerning the rest of organization, at least as well as his subordinates. Condition 1 is satisfied for independent factor loadings, since the factor loading of an asset outside a subordinate hierarchy is independent of the information of the agents in that hierarchy. Condition 1 is also satisfied for two-level hierarchies, since the only agent with a non-trivial subordinate hierarchy is the top agent. We will show that it is satisfied in other cases of interest as well.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Condition 1 holds. Then, there exists a selection of optimal decision rules such that for each agent j, x n (j) and y i (j) are as in Assumption 1 with
To illustrate Proposition 3, we consider again the hierarchical structure in Figure 1 . The investment of agent 1,1 in asset 1 is
Compared to the case where factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero (equation (6)), there is a new term, involving agent 1,1's conditional expectation of λ 3 + λ 4 . This term reflects the fact that agent 1,1 has information on assets 3 and 4, and can adjust his investment to take into account the interaction with these assets. The adjustment consists of two components.
The first is simply
agent 1,1's conditional expectation of the optimal, first-best adjustment, −λ 1 (λ 3 + λ 4 ). The second is
and can be interpreted as a scaling factor for agent 1,1's portfolio, since it is the same for asset 2 as for asset 1. Agent 1,1 chooses this scaling factor so that his portfolio contains no overall adjustment for the interaction with assets 3 and 4 (i.e., the adjustments in assets 1 and 2 sum to zero). Intuitively, agent 1,1's portfolio can be better adjusted for the interaction with assets 3 and 4 by that agent's superior, agent 1, whose information on λ 3 + λ 4 is more accurate.
The scaling factor of agent 1 is
Compared to the i.i.d. case (equation (7)), there is again a new term, reflecting an adjustment for the interaction with asset 4.
The error for asset 1 is equal to that in the i.i.d. case (equation (8)), plus the new terms for agents 1,1 and 1. Rearranging these terms, we can write the error as
This equation is similar to that in the i.i.d. case, and it generalizes nicely the analysis of that case. As in the i.i.d. case, the error for asset 1 is the sum of errors associated to agent 1 and the top agent, and each error is the product of an interaction and an aggregation loss term. The aggregation loss term is exactly as in the i.i.d. case. The interaction term takes a more general form, and reflects the incremental information that an agent has relative to a subordinate, on the assets that are not under the subordinate's control. For example, the interaction term for agent 1 is
and reflects the incremental information agent 1 has relative to agent 1,1, on assets 3 and 4.
It is worth emphasizing how Condition 1 simplifies the analysis. In our example, Condition 1 requires that agent 1,1 has no incremental information on asset 4, relative to agent 1. While Condition 1 is useful for simplifying the optimal decision rules, it is not needed for characterizing them. In Theorem 1 (stated in the Appendix) we show that optimal decision rules can be characterized through a set of first-order conditions for each agent.
The first-order conditions for agent j are
e n I(j)
for i = 1, .., S(j), where e n is the error for asset n. The intuition is that agent j must not be able to reduce the sum of expected squared errors, by changing the investment in an asset he examines, or the scaling factor of a subordinate's portfolio. This general characterization does not require Condition 1. Rather, Condition 1 is useful because it allows us to find a simple solution to the first-order conditions.
The Common Component Case
One way to introduce correlation in factor loadings is to assume that they are the sum of a component which is common to all assets, and an i.i.d. component. This captures the notion that the determinants of an asset's factor loading are either economy-wide, or asset-specific. We set λ n = ζ + ξ n , where ζ denotes the common component, ξ n the i.i.d.
component, and ζ and {ξ n } n=1,..,N are independent. For notational simplicity, we assume that ζ and {ξ n } n=1,..,N have mean zero. We also assume that they are normal, so that Condition 1 holds. Indeed, under normality, the sum of factor loadings over a set A is a sufficient statistic, relative to all factor loadings in A, for the common component ζ.
Therefore, it is also a sufficient statistic for the sum of factor loadings over the complement of A.
Since assets are ex-ante identical, the assignment of assets to agents does not matter, and we only need to determine the optimal hierarchical structure. We first compute the sum of expected squared errors for a general hierarchical structure.
Lemma 3 Suppose that λ n = ζ + ξ n , where ζ ∼ N (0, σ 2 ζ ), ξ n ∼ N (0, σ 2 ξ ), and all variables are independent. Suppose also that agents follow the optimal decision rules of Proposition 3. Then,
where r ≡ σ 2 ζ /σ 2 ξ .
Equation (15) generalizes equation (10) of the i.i.d. case. Using equation (15), we can determine the optimal hierarchical structure.
Proposition 4 Suppose that λ n = ζ + ξ n , where ζ ∼ N (0, σ 2 ζ ), ξ n ∼ N (0, σ 2 ξ ), and all variables are independent. In any optimal hierarchical structure:
ii. agents must handle exactly K assets or portfolios, except at most the top agent.
The optimal hierarchical structure is as in in the i.i.d. case: agents have only one subordinate, and work at full capacity except perhaps one. As in the i.i.d. case, the intuition for the one subordinate result is that aggregation loss is large even for two assets. The common component does not affect the aggregation loss term, since this term is the difference between one factor loading and an average of factor loadings.
The only difference with the i.i.d. case concerns the position of an agent working below capacity. While in the i.i.d. case such an agent can be at any hierarchical level, in the common component case he can be only at the top. This means that returns to ability are highest at the bottom of the hierarchy. Intuitively, the benefit of placing a high ability agent at the top is that he can process more disagreggated information. This benefit is the same as in the i.i.d. case, since the aggregation loss term is the same. By contrast, the benefit of placing a high ability agent at the bottom is larger than in the i.i.d. case. Indeed, a high ability agent can examine more assets, and so obtain more accurate information on the common component. Therefore, he can better take into account the interactions with the assets he does not examine, and so form a better portfolio.
The Group Component Case
An alternative way to introduce correlation in factor loadings is to assume that they are the sum of a component which is common to all assets in a given group, and an i.i.d. component. Groups may, for example, correspond to industries or countries. When assets are sorted into groups, they are not identical ex-ante (in particular, not in relation to other assets). Therefore, the assignment of assets to agents matters, and the organization designer's problem becomes more complicated. To gain some insights on the solution, we consider a simple example where there are N = 4 assets, each agent can process K = 2 assets, and there are two groups, one consisting of assets 1 and 2, and the other of assets 3 and 4. We set λ n = ζ 12 + ξ n , for n = 1, 2, and λ n = ζ 34 + ξ n , for n = 3, 4, where the group components ζ 12 and ζ 34 are i.i.d., and are independent of the i.i.d. components {ξ n } n=1,..,4 .
We also assume that all variables are mean zero and normal.
There are four possible combinations of hierarchical structures and assignments of assets to agents, illustated in Figure 4 . First, the one-subordinate homogeneous hierarchy, H 1 , in which each agent has one subordinate, and the bottom agent examines assets in the same group. Second, the one-subordinate heterogeneous hierarchy,Ĥ 1 , which differs from H 1 in that the bottom agent examines one asset in each group. Third, the two-subordinate homogeneous hierarchy, H 2 , in which the top agent has two subordinates, each of whom examines assets in the same group. Finally, the two-subordinate heterogeneous hierarchy, H 2 , which differs from H 2 in that subordinates examine one asset in each group.
Proposition 5 Suppose that N = 4, K = 2, λ n = ζ 12 + ξ n for n = 1, 2, and λ n = ζ 34 + ξ n for n = 3, 4, where ζ 12 , ζ 34 ∼ N (0, σ 2 ζ ), ξ n ∼ N (0, σ 2 ξ ), and all variables are independent. Then, H 2 is equivalent toĤ 2 , and both are dominated by H 1 .
Proposition 5 implies that an one-subordinate hierarchy is optimal. This result is the same as in the independent and common component cases, but it is even more surprising in the group component case. Consider, for example, the hierarchies H 1 and H 2 . In the absence of a group component, H 1 dominates H 2 because it is preferable that the top agent knows an exact factor loading and an aggregate of three, rather than two aggregates of two.
In the presence of a group component, however, one might expect H 2 to dominate. This is because the aggregates in H 2 are formed by two assets in the same group, and thus involve little loss of information, while the aggregate in H 1 is formed by three assets, not all in the same group. The reason why H 1 still dominates is that the aggregate of three assets is not as relevant, because some of the top agent's tasks are performed by agent 1. Indeed, since assets 3 and 4 are in the same group, agent 1 has some information on λ 4 , which he can use to adjust his investments for the interaction with asset 4. 11 11 The intuition why H2 andĤ2 are equivalent goes along similar lines. The advantage of H2 is that the
Returns to Specialization
The result that one-subordinate hierarchies are optimal seems contrary to the way many actual organizations are structured. In investment firms, for example, many industry sector analysts report to the same boss, who is in charge of the overall stock portfolio. One feature of actual organizations which is not captured in our model is that there are returns to specialization. Sector analysts, for example, have expertise in their sector, enabling them to analyze the sector stocks better than other analysts. In this section, we show that our model can be extended to incorporate returns to specialization. Furthermore, in the presence of such returns, one-subordinate hierarchies are no longer optimal, and returns to ability can be highest at the top of the hierarchy.
To model returns to specialization, we consider the example of Section 4.3, with one modification. We assume that when an agent examines an asset, he has only the time to To obtain the returns to specialization, it is important to endogenize agents' choice of which information to learn on each asset they examine. Consequently, we treat this choice as part of the solution to the organization designer's problem. We solve this problem in Proposition 6. Proposition 6 Suppose that N = 4, K = 2, λ n = ζ 12 + ξ n for n = 1, 2, and λ n = ζ 34 + ξ n for n = 3, 4, where ζ 12 , ζ 34 ∼ N (0, σ 2 ζ ), ξ n ∼ N (0, σ 2 ξ ), and all variables are independent. Then, if σ 2 ζ /σ 2 ξ is sufficiently large, it is optimal that agents know the group components for the assets they examine. Furthermore, H 2 dominates H 1 ,Ĥ 1 , andĤ 2 .
Proposition 6 implies that if returns to specialization are important (in the sense that the variance of the group component is sufficiently large), then the top agent should have two subordinates, each of whom examines two assets in the same group. The intuition aggregates are formed by assets in the same group, and thus involve little loss of information. The advantage ofĤ2, on the other hand, is that the bottom agents can perform some of the top agent's tasks because they have some information on the assets not under their control.
12 An alternative way to model returns to specialization is to assume that agents can only observe noisy signals of the factor loadings of the assets they examine. Then, an agent examining two assets in the same group has more information on the group component, and so can estimate more accurately each asset's factor loading. We do not model returns to specialization through noisy signals, however, because this is less tractable.
is as follows. Because the group component has a large variance, it represents valuable information, and thus agents should know the group components for the assets they examine.
Given this, the only way for the organization to obtain some information on the i.i.d. components is that assets in each group are examined by the same agent.
Since returns to specialization affect the optimal hierarchical structure, it is interesting to know whether they also affect the returns to ability. To examine this, we modify the previous example by introducing a third group of two assets (assets 5 and 6), and a high ability agent who can process four assets, instead of two as the other agents. We can then show 13 that if returns to specialization are important, the high ability agent should be at the top of the hierarchy, examine two assets in the same group, and have two subordinates also examining two assets in the same group. (Hierarchy H A , illustrated in figure 5 .) The intuition why the high ability agent should be at the top rather the bottom (as, for example, in hierarchy H B ) is that he can perform the high-level task of adjusting investment in each group for the interaction with the other groups, leaving to his subordinates (part of) the low-level task of selecting within-group investments.
Communication and Scaling Constraints
In our model, portfolio formation is subject to the communication constraint, namely, (i) agents form their portfolios by combining the portfolios of their hierarchical subordinates and the assets they examine, and (ii) agents' information concerns only the above portfolios and assets. One way to generalize this constraint is to relax (ii), and allow agents to obtain information on portfolios or assets elsewhere in the hierarchy. If agents can obtain information only on the portfolios of those at lower hierarchical levels (i.e., their subordinates or the subordinates of their hierarchical peers), then the organization's portfolio is still formed in a single iteration, going from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy. If, by contrast, agents can also obtain information on the portfolios of their peers or superiors, then portfolio formation generally involves multiple iterations. For example, the organization can form a trial portfolio, then the top agent can communicate information on this portfolio to the bottom agents, so that a second trial portfolio can be formed, etc. We expect the analysis and the results of the single iteration case to be similar to the ones in this paper. However, the analysis of the multiple iteration case might be substantially more complicated.
An additional constraint that we impose on portfolio formation is the scaling constraint, 13 The proof is available upon request.
namely, agents cannot change the composition of their subordinates' portfolios, but can only scale the portfolios up or down. This constraint follows, in some cases, from agents' optimal behavior. Indeed, when the assets in the portfolio of an agent's subordinate are identical conditional on the agent's information (as in the independent and common component cases), then it is optimal for the agent not to change the composition of the subordinate's portfolio. 14
Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of organizational decision making, in which information processing is decentralized. The model's novel elements are that aggregation entails a loss of useful information, and agents' decision problems interact. These elements seem important in many organizational settings. One such setting, from which our model is motivated, is portfolio selection in investment firms.
In our model, an organization forms a portfolio of risky assets. Portfolio formation is hiearchical: agents combine their subordinates' portfolios and any assets they examine directly into larger portfolios, and communicate information on these portfolios to their superiors. Agents' ability to process information is limited, in that they can combine only a limited number of inputs into a portfolio.
We determine the hierarchical structure, assignment of assets to agents, and agents' decision rules that maximize the quality of organizational decisions. In the cases we examine, the optimal hierarchical structure has a chain form, where all agents have one subordinate.
Furthermore, returns to ability are at least as high at the bottom as at the top of the hierarchy.
One interesting extension is to introduce returns to specialization. This extension is quite realistic, and in the example we examine in this paper, it reverses the one-subordinate result, as well as the result on returns to ability. Other possible extensions are to allow assets to differ in their expected returns, and to consider alternative probability distributions for the factor loadings. In particular, it might be interesting to introduce multiple group components (corresponding, for example, to an asset's industry sector and country). This would raise the question of along which criterion assets should be grouped, a question that has received attention by investment management practitioners. (See, for example, Gunn (2000) .) At a more abstract level, studying optimal grouping might be relevant for understanding whether organizations should be structured according to functions (U-form), products (M-form), or in a hybrid fashion (matrix form).
Appendix
Due to space limitations, this Appendix does not contain the proofs of Propositions 4-6. These proofs are in a separate Appendix, available on the Review of Economic Studies website.
We first state and prove Theorem 1 (referred to at the end of Section 4.1). To state the theorem, we introduce some notation. For an asset n, we denote by j n the agent who examines the asset, i.e., who satisfies n ∈ A M (j n ), and by J n the set of agents who can influence the investment in the asset, i.e., who satisfy n ∈ A N (j). For an agent j ∈ J n \{j n }, we denote by i n (j) the index of j's subordinate who is in J n . The organization's investment in asset n can be expressed as
Given functions {F n (j)} n∈A M (j) and {G i (j)} i=1,..,S(j) , for each agent j, we set
Intuitively, F n (j) and G i (j) will represent the lowest order terms (after the order zero term) in x n (j) and y i (j), respectively, and F n will represent the lowest order term in x n . We denote by F * n the lowest order term in x * n , i.e.,
Finally, we recall the definitions of H(j), J(j), Λ c (j), Γ(j), I(j), andĪ(j), given at the beginning of Section 4.1.
Theorem 1 Suppose that for each agent j, there exist functions {F n (j)} n∈A M (j) and {G i (j)} i=1,..,S(j) , which contain second-degree terms in Γ(j) and λ, and satisfy the first-order conditions
for i = 1, .., S(j). Then, there exists a selection of optimal decision rules such that for each agent j,
for i = 1, .., S(j).
Proof: From Assumption 1, there exists a selection of optimal decision rules such that for each agent j,
for i = 1, .., S(j), wheref n (j) andĝ i (j) contain first-and second-degree terms in γ(j) and λ. We assume initially thatf n (j) andĝ i (j) contain only second-degree terms, and prove the theorem in three steps. In a fourth step, we extend the proof to the case wheref n (j) andĝ i (j) contain also first-degree terms.
Step 1: Definition ofF n and first-order conditions. Since in the limit when λ goes to zero, the organization's investment in each asset converges to µ/aσ 2 , we have
Therefore,f
whereF n (j) andĜ i (j) contain second-degree terms in Γ(j) and λ. Equations (16), (22), (23), (25), and (26), imply that the organization's investment in asset n is
whereF n is defined fromF n (j) andĜ i (j), as in equation (17).
We next show that the first-order conditions (18) and (19) hold if we substitute {F n } n=1,..,N for {F n } n=1,..,N . Consider the organization designer's objective, given in equation (2):
where x ≡ {x n } n=1,..,N ,
Since Q is quadratic, and maximum at x * ≡ {x * n } n=1,..,N , we have
Therefore, we can write the organization designer's objective as
Consider n ∈ A M (j), and suppose that agent j's investment in asset n is perturbed to
where α is a scalar, and h a function of γ(j). This changes the organization's investment in asset n to
The derivative of the organization designer's objective w.r.t. α, for α = 0, is
This has to equal zero, by the optimality of agent j's decision rule. To derive equation (18), we will determine the lowest order term in equation (29), for small factor loadings.
Equation (5) implies that
Equations (5) and (27) imply that
To determine the lowest order term in h, we set
and assume that the function H stays fixed as λ goes to zero. Equation (24) implies that
for some function K. Therefore, the lowest order term in h(γ(j)) is K(Γ 0 (j)), where Γ 0 (j) ≡ Γ(j)/λ. The lowest order term in equation (29) is
Since this has to equal zero, we must have
for all functions K(Γ 0 (j)), i.e., for all I(j)-measurable functions. This implies equation (18).
To derive equation (19), we proceed similarly. We suppose that agent j's scaling factor for the portfolio of his ith subordinate is perturbed to
This changes the organization's investment in any asset n ∈ A N (j, i) to
Writing that the lowest order term in this equation is zero, we find that
which implies equation (19).
Step 2: F n =F n , for all n = 1, .., N . This means that investments by the organization resulting from (i) decision rules of the form (20) and (21), and (ii) the optimal decision rules (22) and (23), are identical up to second-degree terms.
We have
To show that F n =F n , we will show that S =Ŝ = 0. Equation (17) implies that
Using this equation, and summing across agents instead of across assets, we can write S as
which is equal to zero from equation (18) . Similarly,
Therefore, S = 0, and by an identical argument,Ŝ = 0.
Step 3: There exist decision rules of the form (20) and (21), which are optimal. To show this, we will start from the optimal decision rules (22) and (23), and construct decision rules of the form (20) and (21), without modifying the organization's investments. Consider an agent j at the bottom of the hierarchy, and an asset n ∈ A M (j).
Since F n =F n , we have
The LHS of this equation is I(j)-measurable, i.e., is a function of Γ(j) = {λ n } n∈A M (j) . The RHS is a function of Γ(j ) for j ∈ J n \{j}, and can thus depend on Γ(j) only through Λ(j).
Therefore, both the LHS and the RHS are equal to a function K of Λ(j) (and λ), which, in addition, contains second-degree terms. Equation (24) implies that there exists a function k, which contains second-degree terms in λ(j) and λ, such that
Suppose that the decision rule for agent j is modified from (22) (20), since
Proceeding inductively to the top of the hierarchy, we can similarly modify all agents' decision rules so that they take the form (20) and (21).
Step 4:f n (j) andĝ i (j) contain first-degree terms. Suppose thatf n (j) andĝ i (j)
contain first-degree terms in γ(j) and λ. Then
whereF 1 n (j) andĜ 1 i (j) contain first-degree terms in Γ(j) and λ. Moreover,
whereF 1 n is defined fromF 1 n (j) andĜ 1 i (j), as in equation (17). Proceeding as in Step 1, and noting that the first-degree term in x * n is zero, we can show that the first-order conditions (18) and (19) hold if we substitute {F 1 n } n=1,..,N for {F n } n=1,..,N , and zero for {F * n } n=1,..,N . Since (18) and (19) obviously hold if we substitute zero for both {F n } n=1,..,N and {F * n } n=1,..,N , we can proceed as in Step 2, and show thatF 1 n = 0 for all n = 1, .., N . We can then modify the decision rules (22) and (23), so that they do not contain first-degree terms, and yet imply the same investments by the organization. To do this, we proceed as in Step 3. We start with an agent j at the bottom of the hierarchy and show thatF 1 n (j) must be a function of Λ(j) only. We then adjust j's decision rule so that the first-degree terms cancel, and proceed inductively to the top of the hierarchy.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proposition follows from Proposition 3, by noting that since factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero, we have E [ Λ c (j)| I(j)] = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a hierarchical structure H, that maximizes expected utility.
Since expected utility can be expressed as in equation (28), and x * does not depend on H, H must also maximize
Since
Using this equation and equation (30), we can write equation (32) as
If H maximizes this equation for λ small, then it must also maximize the lowest order term, i.e., it must minimize N n=1 E(e 2 n ).
Proof of Lemma 2:
The lemma follows from Lemma 3, by setting r = 0 and σ 2 ξ = σ 2 λ . (Lemma 3 requires normality, but when ζ = 0, normality is not required in the proof.)
Proof of Proposition 2:
We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: Properties of a hierarchical structure that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). Consider such a hierarchical structure, and denote by X the number of agents, by m x , for x = 1, · · · , X − 1, the number of assets examined by the agent in level x (the top is level 1), and by m X + 1 the number of assets examined by the bottom agent. Condition (ii) implies that there exists x p ∈ {1, .., X} (corresponding to the level of the agent who may be working below capacity) such that m x = K − 1 for all x ∈ {1, .., X}\{x p }. We have
where y denotes the smallest integer that is greater or equal than y. Therefore, m xp and X are the same for any hierarchical structure that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii), and we denote them by m(N ) and X(N ), respectively.
Lemma 2 implies that the sum of expected squared errors (which we normalize by σ 4 λ , and refer to as the cost from now on) is
Equation (33) is invariant to a permutation of {m x } x=1,..,X(N ) , and thus the cost is the same for any hierarchical structure that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). We denote the cost by c(N ), and show two properties of c(N ). First,
To show equation (34), we use equation (33), and consider hierarchical structures where the agent who may be working below capacity is at the top. If, with N − 1 assets, the top agent does work below capacity, then by adding one asset, m 1 increases by 1, and equation (33) changes by
If, with N − 1 assets, the top agent works at full capacity, then by adding one asset, we obtain a new top agent with m 1 = 1. The term in equation (33) corresponding to this new agent is
and thus equation (34) holds. A second property of c(N ) is that for n 1 , n 2 > 1,
To show equation (35), we assume without loss of generality that n 1 ≥ n 2 , and denote the LHS by f (n 2 ). Since c(1) = 0, we have f (1) = 0. Therefore, f (n 2 ) is positive if it is increasing. Using equation (34), and the definition of m(N ), we have
Since m(n 1 + n 2 − 1) = m(n 1 ) + m(n 2 ) − (K − 1), where = 0 if m(n 1 ) + m(n 2 ) ≤ K − 1, and = 1 if m(n 1 ) + m(n 2 ) > K − 1, we can write equation (36) as
If n 1 > K or = 0, equation (37) is obviously positive. If n 1 ≤ K and = 1, equation (37) is also positive, since
Step 2: A cost-minimizing hierarchical structure must satisfy conditions (i) and (ii). The key to the proof is the following dynamic programming observation. If a hierarchical structure H is cost-minimizing, then for each agent j, the subordinate hierarchy H(j) must also be cost-minimizing among hierarchies that invest in N (j) assets. Indeed, using Lemma 2, we can write the cost of H as
i.e., as the cost of H(j), plus a term that depends on H(j) only through N (j). Therefore, if H(j) is not cost-minimizing, we can replace it by a cost-minimizing hierarchical structure, and reduce the cost of H.
To show that a cost-minimizing hierarchical structure must satisfy conditions (i) and
(ii), we use the dynamic programming observation, and proceed by induction on the number N of assets. Suppose that the result is true for all N < N (N can be 1), and consider a costminimizing hierarchical structure H, in which the top agent has at least two subordinates, agents 1 and 2. We will show that H is dominated by a hierarchical structure H , in which H(1) is replaced by a cost-minimizing hierarchical structure H (1) for N (1) + N (2) − 1 assets, and H(2) is replaced by one asset. Using Lemma 2, and noting that H(1), H(2), and H (1), must satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) (from the dynamic programming observation and the induction hypothesis), we can write the cost of H and H as
Therefore,
Equation (34) implies that this is positive, contradicting the optimality of H. Therefore, the top agent in H has only one subordinate, agent 1. Since the hierarchical structure H (1) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii), H satisfies condition (i). To show that H satisfies condition
(ii), we need to show that the top agent in H and the agent in H(1) who may be working below capacity (and for whom m xp = m(N − m 1 )) cannot both be working below capacity.
Without loss of generality (since equation (33) 
Therefore, H satisfies condition (ii).
Proof of Proposition 3: From Theorem 1, it suffices to show that the functions
for j ∈ J, n ∈ A M (j), and i = 1, .., S(j), satisfy the first-order conditions (18) and (19).
Setting E(j) ≡ E [ Λ c (j)| I(j)], we have
Noting that
we have j∈Jn\{jn} G in(j) (j) = − j∈Jn\{jn} Λ(j, i n (j)) N (j, i n (j)) [Λ(j) − Λ(j, i n (j))]
Combining equations (38) and (39), and noting that E(·) = 0, we have
where e n (j) ≡ λ n − Λ(j, i n (j)) N (j, i n (j)) [Λ(j) − Λ(j, i n (j)) + E(j) − E(j, i n (j))] , denotes the component of the error e n for asset n, that is associated with agent j.
Consider now an agent j, and denote by B(j) the set of j's direct and indirect superiors.
We will show that for j b ∈ B(j) and n ∈ A N (j), we have E[e n (j b )|I(j)] = 0. Since I(j) ⊂Ī(j b , i n (j b )), it suffices to show that
and apply the law of iterative expectations. Since the aggregation loss term,
is measurable w.r.t.Ī(j b , i n (j b )), it suffices to show that the interaction term,
has zero expectation, conditional onĪ(j b , i n (j b )). Using Condition 1, we have
Therefore, the interaction term is
and it has zero expectation, conditional onĪ(j b , i n (j b )), sinceĪ(j b , i n (j b )) ⊂Ī(j b ).
Equations (40) Summing across agents instead of across assets, we can write the LHS as n ∈A N (j,i) e n (j) + j ∈J(j,i)
e n (j ).
This is equal to zero, since for all j and i, we have n ∈A N (j,i) e n (j) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider j, j b ∈ J n \{j n }, and suppose that j b ∈ B(j). Noting that e n (j) is measurable w.r.t.Ī(j b , i n (j b )), and using equation (41), we have E[e n (j)e n (j b )] = E E e n (j)e n (j b )|Ī(j b , i n (j b ))
= E e n (j)E e n (j b )|Ī(j b , i n (j b )) = 0.
Equation (40) then implies that
E(e 2 n ) = j∈Jn\{jn} E e n (j) 2 .
Since E[e n (j)] = E [E [ e n (j)| I(j n )]] = 0, the aggregation loss and interaction terms are uncorrelated. Normality then implies that these terms are independent. Therefore, E e n (j) 2 is equal to the expected squared aggregation loss term, times the expected squared interaction term. The former is E λ n − n ∈A N (j,in(j)) λ n N (j, i n (j)) 2 = E ξ n − n ∈A N (j,in(j)) ξ n N (j, i n (j)) 2 = σ 2 ξ N (j, i n (j)) − 1 N (j, i n (j)) .
Equation (43) implies that the latter is
E V E Λ c (j, i n (j))|Ī(j) Ī (j, i n (j)) .
Reversing the steps of equation (42), and using normality, we have E Λ c (j, i n (j))|Ī(j) = Λ(j) − Λ(j, i n (j)) + E Λ c (j)|Ī ( Multiplying with the expected squared aggregation loss term, and summing across agents instead of across assets, we obtain equation (15). Figure 1 : The notation for a simple hierarchy. There are three agents, agent ·, agent 1, and agent 1,1. For agent 1, for example, we have S(1) = 1, since this agent has one subordinate, agent 1,1. We also have M (1) = 1 and A M (1) = {3}, since agent 1 examines asset 3. Finally, we have N (1) = 3 and A N (1) = {1, 2, 3}, since the assets under agent 1's control are 1, 2, and 3. Figure 5: Two hierarchical structures for N = 6, K = 2, three groups of assets, and a high ability agent.
